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Introduction 
Said to be higher! - You say that the morality of pity is 
higher morality than that of Stoicism? Prove it! but 
note that 'higher' and 'lower' morality is not to be 
measured by a moral yardstick: for there is no 
absolute morality. So take your yardstick from 
elsewhere and - watch out! 1 
1 
Nietzsche's challenge to traditional morality epitomises the 
rigorous and uncompromising approach he took towards the many 
philosophical issues he addressed. His concern with values and 
morality underpin most of his writings.2 The desire for a new approach 
to values impelled Nietzsche to mount a vigorous attack on value-
systems that he considered outmoded, harmful or irrelevant. His aim 
was to draw attention to the damage he believed ensued from modes of 
behaviour he considered antithetic to the affirmation of life. The 
intensity of his concern focussed on what he took to be the worst cases. 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) Book 1, 139, p. 88. 
2Nietzsche's views as discussed throughout this essay are taken from a variety of 
sources. Those consulted most in regard to the main aspects of his thought are: 
George Morgan, What Nietzsche Means (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1941). 
Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1983). 
E.E. Sleinis, Nietzsche's Revaluation of Values (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1994). 
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Amongst those targeted as being particularly disastrous are pity, 
sympathy and altruism, which according to him, weaken both the giver 
and the recipient. They even threaten the viability of life as a whole. In 
The Antichrist, Nietzsche is uncompromising in his critique of 
Christianity, which he considers to be a major source of negative 
attitudes to life: 
Christianity is called the religion of pity.- Pity is opposed to the tonic passions 
which enhance the energy of the feeling of life: its action is depressing. A man 
loses power when he pities. By means of pity the drain on strength which 
suffering itself already introduces into the world is multiplied a thousandfold 3 
He goes further when expressing his fear of the consequences should 
sympathy become the norm: 
Supposing the drive to attachment and care for others ('sympathetic affection') 
were twice as strong as it is, life on earth would be insupportable (Daybreak, 
Book II, 143, p. 91). 
The practice of altruism is also castigated in a work which undertakes to 
deconstruct conventional moral teachings: 
A Criticism of the Morality of Decadence.- An "altruistic' morality, a morality under 
which selfishness withers, is in all circumstances a bad sign. This is true of 
individuals and above all of nations (Skirmishes in a War with the Age, 35, p. 87, 
in 'The Twighlight of the Idols' in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Levy). 
Nietzsche's revolutionary and determined approach merits a further 
consideration of his views. He acknowledges that he may not be giving 
the final word on these issues, and shows that he wanted his views to 
3Friedrich Nietzsche, 'The Antichrist' 7, p. 131, in The Complete Works of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, vol.16, ed. Oscar Levy (London: T.N. Foulis, 1911). 
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3 
be critically assessed. He saw himself as setting a trend in a motion, to 
be taken up and developed by others: 
It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of those good and 
respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, 
and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things - perhaps even 
being essentially identical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern 
himself with such dangerous "Perhapses"! For that investigation one must await 
the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and 
inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent - philosophers of the 
dangerous "Perhaps" in every sense of the term. And to speak in all 
seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear 4 
One recent study of Nietzsche's revaluation project concurs with that 
view: 
What incompleteness there is in the execution of his enterprise is a challenge to 
go further·5 
The intention of this essay is to try to go further, and to re-
examine the nature of pity, sympathy and altruism. In keeping with 
Nietzsche's stipulation, the yardstick will not be from morality, but rather 
empirical evidence. Cases of pity, sympathy and altruism will be 
examined, with the aim of identifying both the motives of benefactors, 
and the effects of their behaviour on beneficiaries. Long-term 
implications of their practice in society will be considered, as will any 
wider effects on society as a whole. Consideration will then be given to 
the ramifications likely to occur should the presence of altruism, pity 
and sympathy be increased in society. Finally, a judgment will be made 
as to whether Nietzsche's revaluation is successful, whether in fact the 
4Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Beyond Good and Evil' 2, p. 7, in The Complete Works of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, vol.12, ed. Oscar Levy (London: T.N. Foulis, 1911 ). 
5E.E. Sleinis, Nietzsche's Revaluation of Values (Urbano: University of Illinois Press, 
1994) p. 210. 
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factors in question do imply a negative valuation of life. The study 
begins with two issues crucial to an understanding of the work's main 
focus, firstly Nietzsche's own position, and secondly, the nature, 
definition and clarification of the issues under scrutiny. 
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Chapter One: Nietzsche's Case for Revaluation 
1. Nietzsche's Background 
Living during the second half of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche 
thought of society as pervaded with uncertainty and insecurity. He saw 
the prevailing pessimism as signifying a loss of faith. Traditional values 
and institutions were waning, and religion appeared to be losing its grip. 
Concerned to restore humanity's lost direction, Nietzsche undertook to 
investigate human conduct, in the hope of finding a new way forward. 
2. Nietzsche's Philosophy 
Nietzsche's ambitious task led him to question the notion of 
value, and the nature of value systems. He felt that it was in them that 
the cause of much misunderstanding about life lay. If life was 
misunderstood at its very core, then actions, responses, traditions, 
practices, rituals, systems, rules, in fact any domain of human conduct 
would be seriously impaired. Nietzsche's analysis brought him to the 
conclusion that the concept of value had been artificially constructed in 
order to regulate human conduct. In particular the idea of 'binary 
opposition' had been set up for human conduct so as to provide focal 
points for attributing praise and blame. In The Will to Power Nietzsche 
claims that morality does not exist in reality: 
There are no moral actions whatsoever; they are completely imaginary. Not only 
are they indemonstrable ... they are altogether impossible. Through a 
psychological misunderstanding, one has invented an antithesis to the 
motivating forces, and believes one has described another kind of force; one has 
imagined a primum mobile that does not exist at a/16 
6Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1967) 786, p. 413. 
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Morality was enclosed in value systems, inherited over long periods of 
time from a variety of sources, none of which were infallible or absolute. 
Moreover, any value or system of values was a product of a particular 
perspective on life. Each perspective was limited by several factors, 
such as the nature of the human cognitive apparatus and the particular 
time, place and society in which one lived. The possibility of a universal 
perspective from which absolute moral claims could be established was 
thus denied. As a result of these confusions, widespread practices 
existed inimical to the best interests of human beings. Without the 
assurance of an absolute standpoint or the promise of eternal salvation, 
a vacuum existed where God and certainty had previously been 
located. Nietzsche felt compelled to search for a new justification of 
optimism. His reflections brought him to the view that whatever 
tragedies, or disappointments one suffered, life itself could still be 
celebrated and affirmed. The transforming of one's attitude towards life 
could enable humans of high calibre to overcome the worst situations. 
An essential requirement to the process was the re-orientation of 
traditional values. 
3. Nietzsche's Revaluation 
I Nietzsche's re-appraisal of values includes his criticism of other 
I 
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philosophers. His criticism of their 'belief in antitheses of values' is 
followed by the suggestion that our real values lie in direct opposition to 
what has been accepted traditionally: 
In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the 
unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life 
generally should be assigned to pretence, the will to delusion, to selfishness, 
and cupidity (Beyond Good and Evil, 2, p. 7). 
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In light of this, Nietzsche adopts a radically different approach to human 
attitudes and conduct. The power to affirm life, reflected in life-enriching 
activity, was the criteria by which values were to be measured. Values 
antithetic to life were to be rejected, while those which produced life-
enrichment were to be promoted. Consideration of the values in our 
codes of conduct led Nietzsche to mount his attack on pity, sympathy 
and altruism. In a variety of ways, they act against the best interests of 
participants by reducing their power for life-affirming activity: 
Pity insofar as it really causes suffering - and this is here our only point of view - is 
a weakness, like every losing of oneself through a harmful affect. It increases the 
amount of suffering in the world: .... Supposing it was dominant even for a single 
day, mankind would immediately perish of it. (Daybreak, 134, P. 85). 
Actions on behalf of others are equally repudiated, whether the altruism 
is genuine, or performed for one's own benefit: 
- where the individual seeks a value for himself only in the service of others, one 
can be certain that exhaustion and degeneration are present. An altruistic 
disposition, genuine and without tartuffery, is an instinct for creating at least a 
secondary value for oneself in the service of other egoisms. (Will to Power, 785, 
p. 413). 
Nietzsche considers altruism as a form of devaluation of the human 
person. His proposed alternatives are to elevate human attitudes and 
endeavours: 
But if we also want to transcend our own pity and thus achieve victory over 
ourselves, is this not a higher and freer viewpoint and posture than that in which 
one feels secure when one has discovered whether an action benefits or harms 
our neighbour? (Daybreak, 146, p. 92). 
He goes further when considering the contrast between power and 
weakness: 
What it good? All that enhances the feeling of power, the Will to Power, and 
power itself in man. What is bad? - All that proceeds from weakness. What is 
happiness? - The feeling that power is increasing, - that resistance has been 
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overcome. Not contentment, but more power; not peace at any price, but war; 
not virtue, but efficiency ... The weak and the botched shall perish : first principle 
of our humanity. And they ought even to be helped to perish. (The Antichrist, 2, 
p. 128). 
Nietzsche cannot see a place for the favoured treatment of the weak in 
society, nor for encouraging those who would seek to help them. Given 
the radical nature of Nietzsche's stance, a closer examination of the 
nature of pity, sympathy and altruism is warranted. 
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Chapter Two: Definitions and Possibilities 
1. Definitions 
A. General 
Pity, sympathy and altruism are generally considered to be caring 
or helping qualities exercised by one individual or group towards 
another. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines them as 
follows: 
-Pity - To feel pity for; to be sorry for. (sometimes implying slight contempt.) To 
move to pity; To grieve? 
-Sympathy - having a fellow-feeling; A (real or supposed) affinity between 
certain things, by virtue of which they are similarly or correspondingly affected by 
the same influence, affect or influence one another ... (Shorter Oxford, p. 2221). 
-Altruism -Regard for others, as a principle of action; opp. to egoism or 
selfishness B 
If we look at the words as a group, we can see that they could be 
understood as stages of response from one individual or group towards 
another. Pity indicates the initial feelings, the movement of the 
emotions; sympathy denotes the progress of feeling to the deeper stage 
of affinity, while altruism represents the development of action which 
then follows. Other relevant issues are contained in the definitions: Pity 
can imply 'contempt'; sympathy can be 'real or supposed', and altruism 
?Little, Fowler and Coulson, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
vol. II, ed. C.T. Onions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p. 1594. 
Suttle, Fowler and Coulson, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
vol. I, ed. C.T. Onions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p. 54. 
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is understood as the opposite of egoism or selfishness. It is useful at 
this point to explicate - as far as possible - Nietzsche's usage of these 
terms. 
B. Nietzsche's Definition 
Nietzsche's references to pity, sympathy and altruism require to 
be understood within his general thesis on life and revaluation. His 
reference to 'attachment and care for others' and 'sympathetic affection' 
(Daybreak, Book II, 143), generally accords with the definitions above. 
But the quotations given from his writings, for example his reference to 
pity as 'opposed to the tonic passions which enhance the energy of the 
feeling of life: its action is depressing' (The Antichrist, 7, p.131) show 
that he includes them amongst the negative influences with which he 
wants to dispense. For him, in most instances both the giving and the 
receiving of pity, sympathy and altruism are a deficiency, a detriment to 
the quality of life. There appears to be a distinct gap between the 
intentions of the benefactor or sympathiser, and the positive effects or 
lack thereof which result. 
C. Usage in this Essay 
For an objective critique of Nietzsche's work, an objective 
approach to the understanding of pity, sympathy and altruism is 
required. It is also likely that they will overlap, as altruistic actions spring 
from feelings of sympathy, which in turn, can be generated by feelings of 
pity. These characteristics will be either expressed as above, or 
referred to as selfless feelings, and selfless actions, and will be 
assumed to stand in opposition to selfish feelings and selfish actions. 
An examination of possible and actual instances follows. 
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2. Possibilities 
In the twentieth-century, information required for the construction 
of social policies has prompted social psychologists and other analysts 
to conduct specially focused investigations of human behaviour. Many 
of these studies have sought to ascertain the boundaries between 
inherited and learned influences. The question has also arisen whether 
human beings are capable of selfless feelings or actions. This issue will 
be examined from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. 
A. The Theoretical Possibility of Altruism 
In addition to his condemnation of selfless actions as a form of 
weakness, Nietzsche also considered them to be deceptive. He 
believed that when confronted by another's suffering, we feel 
uncomfortable, and any remedial action taken is really for our own 
benefit: 
But it is only this suffering of our own which we get rid of when we perform deeds 
of pity. But we never do anything of this kind out of one motive; as surely as we 
want to free ourselves of suffering by this act, just as surely do we give way to an 
impulse to pleasure with the same act - pleasure arises at the sight of a contrast to 
the condition we ourselves are in (Daybreak, 133, p. 84). 
There is far too much witchery and sugar in the sentiment "for others" and "not for 
myself," for one not needing to be doubly distrustful here, and for one asking 
promptly: "Are they not perhaps - deceptions?" - That they please- him who has 
them, him who enjoys their fruit, and also the mere spectator - '(Beyond Good 
and Evil, 33, p. 48). 
If helping another brings pleasure to the benefactor, the act could 
appear to be selfish, as implied by Nietzsche. If giving my non-driving 
neighbour lifts in my car makes me feel better about myself, I could be 
accused of doing it for that purpose. But there is no proof that I am; the 
truth could equally be that my only intention is to help her. These 
possibilities are considered by James Rachels in The Elements of Moral 
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Philosophy.9 He considers a number of issues regarding the possibility 
for unselfish action in his discussion of Psychological Egoism. Amongst 
his examples is the case of someone feeling good after donating 
money for famine relief. (p.66-69). Rachels concludes that not only is it 
not obvious that satisfaction must be the motive for such action, but 
rather, the very fact that one is able to feel satisfaction follows from the 
genuine desire to help: 
it is nothing more than sophistry to say, because Jones finds satisfaction in giving 
for famine relief, that he is selfish .... Moreover, suppose we ask why Jones 
derives satisfaction from contributing for famine relief. The answer is, it is 
because Jones is the kind of person who cares about other people: even if they 
are strangers to him, he doesn't want them to go hungry, and he is willing to take 
action to help them. If Jones were not this kind of person, then he would take no 
special pleasure in assisting them; and as we have already seen, this is the mark 
of unselfishness, not selfishness (Rachels, pp. 68-69). 
The theory that feeling better in oneself when helping others necessarily 
implies a selfish motivation does not appear reasonable. Consideration 
of the issues involved indicates the precise opposite, that our feeling 
good stems from the fact that we do have a real concern for the other's 
welfare. Indeed, the pleasure felt by the doer would be unintelligible if 
the doer did not have a genuine desire for the well-being of the 
recipient. Nietzsche's suggestion that our helping actions are 
performed for our own benefit would seem at least, open to question. 
The matter will be taken further, by inquiring into whether human 
behaviour here is influenced in any way by genetic factors. 
9James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 2nd ed. (1986: New York: McGraw 
Hill Inc, 1993). 
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B. The Practical Possibility 
In his analysis, Nietzsche felt it was necessary to consider 
humans as 'natural' beings, in both their physical and mental aspects. 
He felt that this dimension had been neglected by other philosophers. It 
was particularly relevant to his conceptio11 of morality: 
I will formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality - that is to say, every sound 
morality is ruled by a life instinct - any one of the laws of life is fulfilled by the 
definite cannon "thou shalt," "thou shalt not," and any sort of obstacle or hostile 
element in the road of life is thus cleared away (Morality as the Enemy of Nature, 
4, p. 30, in 'The Twilight of the Idols' in The Complete Works of Friedrich 
Nietzsche). 
The extent to which the 'life instinct' might influence human action is 
now addressed. As more is known about the human organism, it 
becomes increasingly apparent that genes play a large part in shaping 
our behaviour. Some of these investigations will be looked at to 
determine what types of selfless feelings and actions are possible, and 
what types actually occur. 
The study of genes and their influences by Richard Dawkins1 o 
has produced some relevant material regarding genetic propensities. A 
brief summary follows: 
The biological realm reveals an intense drive for survival, 
centralised in the gene. The gene has provided the main impetus in the 
process of evolution. Its prime task is to secure stable forms under 
which it can thrive and multiply. Alongside these stable forms there 
occurs the continual extinction of unstable life-forms, leading to the 
development of replicators and various types of bodies. Bodies that 
1°Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, new ed. (1976; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989). This summary is taken from throughout the book. 
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achieve successful survival techniques are those with genes conducive 
to that end. In genetic terms, 'selfish' behaviour is more favourable than 
'selfless' behaviour. 
Alongside the 'selfish' inclination of genes, there is a place for co-
operation in the gene story. Although not directly physically linked in a 
body, genes for mutually compatible characteristics, eg. teeth and 
intestines, survive well together. Genetically based co-operation exists 
within and between species. However, genetic traits are not 'fixed 
and unmodifiable' . We can apply learned behaviour to override our 
genetic instincts. Genes in fact, are slow to react as they develop 
survival techniques. It is the brain which immediately puts strategies 
into practice. Dawkins introduces the concept of 'memes' - learned 
behaviour that can be passed on from one generation to the next, 
thereby breaking the nexus between animals and humans. Habits and 
traits which are passed on have the capacity to survive far beyond the 
inherited span of genes. Our own choices of behaviour can dominate 
and overcome many genetic inclinations. 
Conclusion: 
All life forms are physically controlled by their genes. Genes 
affect physical characteristics and behavioural abilities. Because the 
passing on of genes is vital for their survival, genes incline their 'hosts' 
(bodies) towards 'selfish' behaviour, that is, actions which promote their 
survival, as opposed to the survival of genes which belong to someone 
else. 
Two important factors emerge from these studies. Firstly, not all 
self-regarding behaviour is selfish. Co-operation occurs in nature, as 
some actions are performed for the mutual benefit of organisms. 
Secondly, human behaviour is not solely dependent on genes. We are 
free to promote strategies independent of those to which our genes 
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inclines us, that is, selfless rather than selfish behaviour. From both a 
theoretical and a practical point of view, humans are capable of co-
operative and selfless behaviour, and such behaviour is not necessarily 
against our natural instincts. These two issues will now be examined 
further to discover what actually happens in the human realm. Firstly, 
the study will focus on the degree to which humans overcome their 
supposedly natural selfish instincts to perform selfless or altruistic acts, 
and secondly, whether humans adopt any such actions as part of a co-
operative strategy aimed towards mutual survival. 
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Chapter Three: Empirical Evidence for Genuine 
Altruism 
1. Introduction to Batson 
16 
The study by C. Daniel Batson11 consists of a detailed 
examination of different types of altruistic behaviour. He notes that the 
issue of whether humans are capable of selfless actions has been of 
interest to philosophers since the earliest studies of human nature, from 
the time of Plato and Aristotle until the present day (Batson, p.17-42). 
An upsurge of interest in the 1970s, resulted in many experiments by 
psychologists and other theorists. Their aim was to discover in what 
form selfless behaviour actually occurs. In commenting on their studies, 
Batson coined the term 'pseudo-altruism' to denote several varieties of 
behaviour which incorporated a degree of egoism (Batson, p. 43). The 
types of behaviour studied included: helping of any kind, regardless of 
motivation; helping to increase one's own self-esteem, and helping to 
reduce one's uneasiness at another's distress (Batson, p.43-45). 
Dissatisfied with this as the complete story regarding altruism, Batson 
pursued the matter further. He wanted to discover whether there was 
any evidence for altruistic behaviour which did not include any 
additional goals, in other words, 'genuine altruism.' 
The essential criterion that distinguishes genuine altruism from 
'pseudo-altruism' is motive. If I undertake to do my neighbour's 
shopping because I like the morning tea which I receive afterwards, I 
cannot be said to be practicing genuine altruism. But if my only 
intention is to help her, and my enjoyment of the morning tea is purely 
11 C. Daniel Batson, The Altruism Question (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1991 ). 
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incidental, then my action is genuinely altruistic. Batsons' difficulty is 
that the study of behaviour alone tells us nothing whatsoever about 
motivation. We can cite the most apparently generous and self-
sacrificing situations, but viewed externally, they do not reveal the 
motives of their participants. A more comprehensive approach than 
general observation was required. 
Batson argued that there were a number of decisive factors in 
altruism. He recognised that goals could not be discerned externally, 
but could only be inferred; more than one instance was required to 
collect sufficient evidence, and also, if different goals were postulated, 
considerable light could be thrown on what the ultimate goal of the 
person's action might be (Batson, p. 65). If an investigation took these 
factors into account, it should be possible to provide important 
information about altruism. Such an investigation would have to 
examine true and potential goals in different combinations, thereby 
exposing the boundaries between purpose and action (Batson, p. 66). 
A suitable model for his experiment was required due to the gap 
between the intention of the helper and the action performed. The 
Gallilean model was chosen as this contained pre-determined features 
which could be tested (Batson, p.67). The model allows for the variable 
factors necessary to the identification of true goals. 
2. Research and Experiment 
The initial stage of Batsons' hypothesis considered three 
possible motivations for responding to a person's need for help: 
anticipation of reward and avoidance of punishment; the aim of 
reducing one's own unease at another's distress, and finally, a genuine 
desire to help for its own sake. These alternatives can be illustrated in 
the following way: I have been informed that one of the three people 
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required to help at the school canteen for the day is unable to attend 
due to illness. If only two people carry out the work required they will 
have to work much harder than usual and will be unable to take any 
breaks. They happen to know that I have no serious commitments for 
the day, and that I am available to help. If I choose to work in the 
canteen for the day, according to the model under discussion, there are 
three possible alternatives for my doing so: 1) I anticipate praise and 
gratitude from those whom I help out, or I am afraid of getting a 
reputation for being selfish and uncaring; 2) I feel very uncomfortable 
about the situation, and know my day would be spoilt anyway because 
of the way I feel, or 3) I want to help out because I am genuinely 
concerned for the discomfort that would otherwise be experienced by 
the other two people involved. The first two alternatives are recognised 
as being egoistic, whilst the third is the only genuinely altruistic 
response. The two possible egoistic reasons why people might 
respond to another's need are discussed by Batson. Motivation is 
recognised as sometimes occurring from the desire to receive rewards, 
avoid censure, or reduce one's own distress. Such options require to 
be removed from the available choices if one is to eliminate the non-
altruistic response. Both contemporary and early psychologists concur 
that selfish responses are unsatisfactory as explanations of all instances 
of apparently selfless behaviour (Batson, p.82). 
The third possibility is now examined: 
The proposed argument for the existence of altruism outlined on Path 3 is, then 
as follows: Empathy is an other-oriented vicarious emotion produced by taking 
the perspective of a person perceived to be in need. It is distinct from personal 
distress. The magnitude of empathic emotion is a function of the magnitude of 
the perceived need and the strength of the perceiver's attachment to the person 
in need . .... Consistent with the definition of altruism ... the ultimate goal of this 
motivation is to increase the other's welfare, not one's own (Batson, pp. 89-90). 
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Batson noted that previous studies indicated that altruistic responses 
were motivated by feelings of empathy towards the 'victim' (Batson p. 
58). It is worth noting that 'adopting the needy person's perspective' 
(Batson p. 83) is a crucial factor in the arousal of sympathy. Nietzsche 
also regarded an individual's perspective as an essential factor in their 
response to experience. Another important element in the empathy-
altruism hypothesis is that the degree of empathy experienced is in 
proportion to both the amount of perceived need, and the amount of 
affinity felt towards the victim (Batson, p. 89). But even in cases where 
helping behaviour is motivated by sympathetic feelings, the possibility of 
egoistic influence is not eliminated. Although empathy is aroused, 
underlying egoistic motivations could still be present. 
It is possible that any action could be influenced by selfish 
desires, even if these desires are not immediately obvious. The 
presence of empathy could be related to social rewards, fear of 
reprisals, or removing one's own distress (Batson, p. 96-98). Again, the 
crucial question is the identification of ultimate goals. While these 
feelings could clearly be exerting an influence, the essential issue is 
the aim towards which the action is focused (Batson, p.100). Only if its 
aim is towards the victim, with the sole intention of relieving suffering, 
can the action be considered purely selfless or altruistic. Taking into 
account the .evidence thus far, Batson devised a series of experiments 
to reveal the ultimate motives for helping behaviour (Batson, p. 113). 
Subjects were divided into three groups, with the aim of exposing any 
elements considered extraneous to the main purpose of alleviating the 
victim's suffering. These groups were referred to as Aversive- Arousal 
Reduction, Empathy-Specific Punishment, and Empathy-Specific 
Reward, respectively. 
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Each option was tested by means of several experiments. The 
aim of the first group, Aversive-Arousal Reduction, was to expose 
behaviour oriented towards reducing the distress of the benefactor 
rather than that of the beneficiary. To this end, laboratory experiments 
were conducted in which the appropriate features were present. The 
first of these experiments is described as follows: 
In the first two studies, female undergraduates observed a young woman named 
Elaine, whom they believed was receiving uncomfortable electric shocks. They 
were then given an unanticipated chance to help by volunteering to take the 
shocks in her stead. Both ease of escape and empathy were experimentally 
manipulated. 
To manipulate ease of escape, participants in each experiment were informed 
that if they did not take Elaine's place, either they would continue to observe her 
take the shocks (difficult escape condition) or they would not (easy-escape 
condition). Level of empathic emotional response to Elaine's suffering (low v 
high) was manipulated differently in the two experiments. In the first, similarity 
was used to manipulate empathy; in the second, an emotion-specific 
misattribution technique was used (Batson, p. 113). 
Various responses were possible. Following the experiment, results 
were collated and analysed. They showed that many participants who 
had been manipulated to feel little empathy for Elaine reduced their 
distress by either taking the option, if available to them, to leave the 
experiment, or choosing to take the shocks in Elaine's stead if it was not. 
Leaving may have been for the purpose of reducing their own distress, 
as feeling the shocks may have been a less severe experience than 
watching someone else take them. One interesting result relates to the 
participants who had been manipulated to feel strong empathy with the 
victim. Whether their opportunity for 'escape' was difficult or easy, a 
high proportion of them chose to give help (Batson, p. 116-117). Further 
experiments were conducted, to progressively identify, isolate and 
eliminate possible selfish motivations. Out of six experiments, five 
showed the results anticipated in the empathy-altruism hypothesis 
(Batson, p. 111) in which selfless helping, as opposed to selfish 
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helping was predicted for the majority of empathy-induced participants, 
regardless of whether they were able to 'escape' or not (Batson, p. 126). 
The next task was to test the second option, the Empathy Specific 
Punishment hypothesis. Suitable experiments were set up to obtain 
responses in a variety of situations. Because factors, such as possible 
ultimate and accidental goals, were altered between experiments, the 
reasons behind helping behaviour could be discerned. The first one of 
these experiments was conducted by Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, 
McCarthy, and Varney in 1986: 
individuals feeling either low or high empathy for a person in need were 
confronted with an opportunity to help in a situation in which no one else - not 
even the person in need - would ever know if they decided not to help. If socially 
evaluative circumstances are a necessary condition for the empathy-helping 
relationship, as the social-evaluation version of the empathy-specific punishment 
hypothesis proposes, then in such a situation the empathy-helping relationship 
observed in past studies should disappear.. On the other hand, if empathy 
evokes motivation to reduce the victim's need, as the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis proposes, then even in this situation the relationship should remain 
(Batson, p. 129). 
In other words, if participants declined to help the needy person, they 
could not receive social disapproval as no one individual would be 
aware of the full details of the situation. Should help be offered, there 
would be no egoistic-type rewards available to those volunteering. The 
experiment consisted of participants receiving letters from a lonely long-
distance student, and their responses being recorded (Batson, p.130). 
Manipulation and alteration of factors in the subsequent tests removed 
possible misleading combinations of circumstances. The results from 
seven trials showed that the balance weighed in favour of the empathy-
altruism hypothesis. Here, this meant that any help given was not 
connected to avoiding 'punishment', and was thus attributed to genuine 
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altruism (Batson, p. 148), or, in other words, selfless actions flowing from 
selfless feelings. 
The third and final group of studies addressed the remaining 
possibility, the Empathy-Specific Reward hypothesis. The focus of the 
experiments was on isolating and eliminating the opportunity to receive 
social or self-rewards: 
The empathy-specific reward hypothesis claims that we learn through 
socialization that we are eligible for special praise from others or special self-
rewards when we help a person for whom we feel empathy. Thereafter, when we 
feel empathy, we think of these social or self-rewards and help out of an egoistic 
desire to gain them (Batson, p. 149). 
The experiments investigated connections between helping behaviour 
and anticipated rewards. Tasks of an elementary nature were 
connected to the opportunity to reduce the number of electric shocks to 
be received by another participant (Bats9n, p. 150). Features of the 
tests were varied within and between experiments, such as some 
participants having their opportunity to help withdrawn. Results showed 
that the helping behaviour demonstrated could not, in the majority of 
instances, be reconciled with the empathy-specific reward hypothesis, 
but was more in keeping with the empathy-altruism alternative (Batson, 
p. 173), that is, help was given solely for the benefit of the 'sufferer' or 
'victim'. 
Batson recognised the difficulty of the material with which he was 
dealing. To state categorically the motives for any given action is 
virtually impossible. But if experiments are set up that eliminate all 
possibilities of selfish motivation, it is reasonable to assume that the 
motivation which remains is altruistic. Batson concludes that while a 
certain proportion of the evidence remains ambiguous, and could reflect 
either egoistic or altruistic motivation, there is a small amount which 
definitely indicates the presence of selfless actions, motivated by 
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selfless feelings (Batson, p. 207-208). If an experiment produces these 
findings, we need to take seriously the presence of pure altruism in the 
world. It is this possibility which concerns Nietzsche. 
3. A Hypothetical Case 
What Nietzsche fears most is increasing what he considers to be 
destructive altruism, cases where a dependent relationship exists, care 
being administered in one direction only, such as in cases of sickness. 
Only Nietzsche's own words can adequately convey the intensity of his 
feeling: 
The sick represent the greatest danger for the healthy; it is not the strongest but 
the weakest who spell disaster for the strong .... The sick are man's greatest 
danger; not the evil, not the "beasts of prey." Those who are failures from the 
start, downtrodden, crushed - it is they, the weakest, who must undermine life 
among men, who call into question and poison most dangerously our trust in life, 
in man, and in ourselves .... But no greater or more calamitous misunderstanding 
is possible than for the happy, well-constituted, powerful in soul and body, to 
begin to doubt their right to happiness in this fashion. Away with this "inverted 
world"! Away with this shameful emasculation of feeling! That sick should not 
make the healthy sick - and this is what such an emasculation would involve -
should surely be our supreme concern on earth; but this requires above all that 
the healthy should be segregated from the sick, guarded even from the sight of 
the sick, that they may not confound themselves with the sick. Or is it their task, 
perhaps, to be nurses or physicians? 
But no worse misunderstanding and denial of their task can be imagined: the 
higber ought not to degrade itself to the status on an instrument of the lower, the 
pathos of distance ought to keep their tasks eternally separate! Their right to 
exist, the privilege of the fulltoned bell over the false and cracked, is a thousand 
times greater: they alone are our warranty for the future, they alone are liable for 
the future of man. The sick can never have the ability or obligation to do what 
they can do, what they ought to do, how can they at the same time be physicians, 
consolers, and "saviours" of the sick?12 
The sick are incapable of being their own consolers or healers, and the 
healthy are not to degrade themselves by helping them. Nietzsche 
believed that this point was fundamental to the future of humanity. If the 
healthy wasted themselves on the sick, the strong on the weak, the rich 
12Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals' in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. 
W. Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1966) Third Essay, Section 14, pp. 557-561. 
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on the poor, they could become exhausted, take on something of their 
opposite, and spread weakness like an infectious disease, thereby 
obstructing the enrichment of human life which Nietzsche sought to 
provoke. His view is challenging, but assessment of it on rational 
grounds is difficult. Looking at an opposing viewpoint may help the 
process. Although the view may not directly answer him, it may bring to 
light points not yet touched. One person who consciously dedicates 
her life to altruistic work with the most sick and wretched people on 
earth, writes the following: 
I must be willing to give whatever it takes not to harm other people and, in fact, to 
do good to them. This requires that I be willing to give until it hurts. Otherwise, 
there is no true love in me and I bring injustice, not peace, to those around me 
.... We all thirst for the love of others, that they go out of their way to avoid 
harming us to do good to us. This is the meaning of true love, to give until it hurts 
.... When I pick up a person from the street, hungry, I give him a plate of rice, a 
piece of bread. But a person who is shut out, who feels unwanted, unloved, 
terrified, the person who has been thrown out of society - that spiritual poverty is 
much harder to overcome .... Then there was the man we picked up from the 
drain, half-eaten by worms and, after we had brought him to the home, he only 
said, "I have lived like an animal in the street, but I am going to die as an angel, 
loved and cared for." Then, after we had removed all the worms from his body, all 
he said, with a big smile, was: "Sister, I am going home to God" - and he died13 
Mother Teresa refers to several elements as important in human life: 
'injustice ... peace ... spiritual poverty' and on several occasions 'love'. 
She obviously sees these as fundamental issues when considering the 
worth of both individuals and society. In addition, she indicates that it is 
acceptable, even desirable that in cases where humans are deficient or 
incapable in themselves, others of better circumstances, prompted by 
pity or sympathy, should aid them. But is there any factor, fundamental 
13Mother Teresa, Whatever You did unto One of the Least of These, You did unto Me -
address to the Annual National Prayer Breakfast in Washington, D.C. Feb 3, 1994. 
Published by the Schiller Institute, Inc. P.O. Box 2044, Washington D.C. 20041-0244 
(202) 544-7018. 
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to uplifting human life which determines the appropriate response of the 
strong to the weak? Should it be that proposed by Nietzsche, or that 
proposed by Mother Teresa? What argument could show one way or 
the other, whether society is better served by devoting its resources to 
the care of, for example, a chronic alcoholic, or instead to the education 
of a potential musical genius? The research required to adequately 
answer these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, but I offer 
some suggestions. 
Nietzsche is anxious to promote a healthy, thriving society, one in 
which the strong, healthy and vigorous will prosper, able to enjoy the 
finest fruits of art, music, literature, in fact the greatest embellishments of 
life to which human endeavour can aspire. Nietzsche's views on the 
results of interaction between the sick and the healthy, or the weak and 
the strong, would prompt him to prefer the allocation of resources to the 
potential musical genius, rather than to the ailing victim. On the other 
hand, Mother Teresa's attitude shows she would see more positive 
benefits ensuing from the kind of helping actions she has described. 
She believes they will bring an increase in justice, peace, spiritual 
wealth, and love, and that it is the presence of these things which 
enhances life. If our yardstick at this point is Nietzsche's requirement for 
life-enhancing values, we need to consider which of the above positions 
is the most tenable. 
The first consideration is whether or not unconditional helping 
provokes the spread of weakness, sickness and degradation, or peace, 
justice, spiritual growth and love. No conclusive answer can possibly 
be given to a question like this, as the outcome depends on many 
complex factors. What is certain is that Nietzsche's outcome cannot be 
taken for granted. Let us accept therefore, that Mother Teresa's 
viewpoint warrants further investigation. If as she states, caring for the 
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alcoholic brings an increase in peace, justice, spiritual wealth and love, 
we need to assess whether they contribute more enhancement to life 
than would the enrichment of culture envisioned by fostering the 
musical genius. But, there is a pertinent point to bear in mind. An 
integral part of the affirmation of one is the conscious rejection of the 
other. By devoting resources to the care of the alcoholic we are 
consequently choosing to deny the training of the musician, and by 
choosing to train the musician we are simultaneously abandoning the 
alcoholic. 
In the first option, fostering the training of a brilliant musician will 
allow him to realise his fullest potential, bringing personal satisfaction 
and enrichment to him as an individual. As his music could be 
appreciated by countless others across both space and time, numerous 
other lives will be enriched also. There is little difficulty in affirming the 
abundance of life-enhancing potential in this component of option one. 
Added to this, the life of the alcoholic will entail continual suffering, 
illness, and eventually premature death. None of the proposed qualities 
of justice, peace and the like will be engendered, either for the alcoholic 
or for those who would have cared for him. Also, persons who might 
have helped the alcoholic will have deliberately chosen not to do so. 
On the other hand, in the second option, the alcoholic is cared for, and, 
although he still suffers and eventually dies a premature death, his 
suffering is eased. The musician is neglected, does not reach his full 
potential, and thus denies enjoyment to millions. There is both 
perplexity and complexity in any attempt to assess these alternatives. 
Reaching the fullness of one's potential, especially when others stand to 
share in the products, is undoubtedly life-affirming. But what of the 
neglect and disregard for the life another human being, albeit 
unproductive, even wasted, which is the price?, or the lost opportunity 
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for altruistic actions? The crucial question is, which is the more serious 
loss, and which is the more valuable gain? Perhaps it is possible to 
weigh one option against the other. 
Denying training to the musician means that one individual does 
not develop his talents, and that many people are denied the pleasures 
of his music. Withholding assistance to the alcoholic means that he 
suffers more, dies prematurely, and that there is less of the values 
claimed for altruistic action than there might otherwise have been. An 
insight into the reaction of volunteers working in the slums of India is 
revealed in the following extracts: 
The work gives a certain sense which is somehow beyond an ordinary feeling - I 
don't know how to describe it really, it was just peace. Tremendous peace would 
descend upon me every single day 14 
The more you give the more you get And all the time you're giving, loving and 
helping, more is given to the world, more than we'd ever know from our one small 
step. It's like having a kind of empathy with the heart of the world ( A Simple 
Path, p. 177.) 
I know that I will continue to work with the poor because of the satisfaction and 
the happiness it brings to me. I've been happier here than I've ever been so I 
shouldn't ignore this. There's something in it, something there. In hindsight I 
see how unhappy I was in the past - a lot of people I know have this feeling, this 
restlessness, and convince themselves they are content (A Simple Path, p. 
140). 
The feelings of pleasure are similar to those noted earlier (Rachels), as 
being characteristic signs of genuine altruism. The issue might now be 
expressed as personal fulfilment and life-enrichment through music, or 
human survival and life-enrichment of the kind felt by the altruist. The 
factors in the first alternative are simple enough to identify, but what of 
the second? What is there about contributing to the survival of a 
human-being from the lowest rungs of society, and the kind of 
consequences outlined, that could make it the superior choice? 
14Mother Teresa, A Simple Path, complied L. Vardey (London: Random House, 1995) 
p. 177. 
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Extolling the virtues of the musician is at the same time extolling 
the virtues of his music. Its capacity to express emotion, passion and 
spirit brings an affinity between humans who experience them. When 
one considers the issue of 'affinity' one finds that it lies at the base of 
most types of positive human interaction. Affinity consists in part of 
fellow-feelings, having things in common, and shared understandings. 
The more different elements there are between humans, the less affinity 
there is. Conversely, it follows that where there are fewer differences 
between people, the more elements there must be in common, and 
therefore the more affinity. The level of least difference between 
humans must be at the most fundamental level of human experience -
that is, human life itself. Human life may thus provide the foundation for 
all affinity between humans. If this is so, affinity between humans in 
selective areas may be underpinned by a concealed affinity at a deeper 
level, even dependent on it. Thus, should the foundation be threatened, 
all which rests on it would be undermined. Consequently, to prefer the 
training of the musician to aiding the survival of the alcoholic implies 
that one is choosing to support an element of the enrichment of life over 
and above the fact of life itself. It also suggests that one is supporting 
life at one level, but negating it at a more fundamental one. If we take 
our consideration beyond a single instance, we might reflect on what 
might happen should such principles become accepted, as Nietzsche 
suggested. Would the kind of society which allows the neglect of 
'inferior' human lives, on behalf of the superior and excellent, be one 
which we could seriously accept? Could it legitimately take its place in 
a 'civilised' world? Could we cope with the many principles of equity, 
fairness, justice and traditional understandings of moral responsibility 
which it would contront? More importantly, would life as a whole be 
threatened once we begin to make some life expendable? While there 
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can be no conclusive answer, consideration of the above factors 
indicate that curtailing altruism may hold damaging consequences not 
entailed in those which Nietzsche feared by its further spread. Attention 
will now be focussed on altruism as a co-operation strategy. 
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Chapter Four: Altruism as a Co-operation Strategy 
1. Introduction to Axelrod 
The study by Dawkins on genes and their influence refers to co-
operation within and between species. To a degree this co-operation is 
part of the survival strategy of the natural world. Human behaviour is 
paradoxical inasmuch as it is so like, yet so different from the rest of 
nature. We are so much more able to manipulate our behaviour to our 
own ends. Able to develop new ways of responding, we are not bound 
solely by our genes. Dawkins recognised this: 
Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us 
understand what our own selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least 
have the chance to upset their designs, something that no other species has 
ever aspired to 15 
Like altruism, co-operation has a history of interest amongst theorists, 
particularly in the latter part of the twentieth-century (Axelrod, p.3-4). 
Robert Axelrod studied the question, with particular interest in its 
evolutionary ramifications: 
The evolutionary perspective suggested three distinct questions. First, how can 
a potentially cooperative strategy get an initial foothold in an environment which 
is predominantly non-cooperative? Second, what type of strategy can thrive in a 
variegated environment composed of other individuals using a wide diversity of 
more or less sophisticated strategies? Third, under what conditions can such a 
strategy, once fully established among a group of people, resist invasion by a 
less cooperative strategy? (Axelrod, p. xii). 
We already know that, a) nature permits co-operation as part of survival 
strategy, and that b) research indicates that altruistic behaviour does 
occur in human society. The questions posed by Axelrod are relevant to 
15Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation (London: Penguin, 1984) p. viii. 
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as they help in assessing Nietzsche's proposals regarding the 
diminution of selfless actions motivated by concern for others. 
2. Research and Experiment 
Axelrod begins by addressing the question of how co-operation 
might be established in society without the necessity for imposition 
(Axelrod, p. 4). He takes it as given that self-interest is not necessarily in 
opposition to that of others. Often our own well-being is intrinsically 
bound up with that of those close to us. The difficulties in behavioural 
strategies occur mainly when the connections between people or 
groups are not immediately obvious. In order to yield the required data, 
Axelrod devised a game-strategy which would allow simulation of 
helping situations by means of game-play (Axelrod, p. 7-8). The game 
was set up to test responses to opportunities to act in one of two 
different ways. Either one could choose to 'co-operate' or to 'defect.' 
However, the results of what one did were not dependent solely on 
one's own move. The Prisoner's Dilemma game took into account the 
moves of both players when awarding rewards or punishments. Four 
alternative results were possible. If both players chose to co-operate, 
both were awarded three points. If both players chose to defect, each 
received only one point. In the case where player A co-operated and 
player B defected, A receives nothing while B received five points, 
points being similarly awarded where the moves are reversed. It can be 
seen that an element of risk is involved whichever move one choses to 
make. The idea is that consideration of the other party by co-operating 
can lead to either a good score for both, or, where the consideration is 
only one-sided, the so-called 'sucker' loses out completely, and the 
'cheat' gets away with more. Such a game may seem to be a long way 
from a consideration of Nietzsche's philosophy on pity, sympathy and 
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altruism, but the acceptance of a particular principle of personal conduct 
between individuals may impact on society. Where that behaviour 
becomes policy, the effect can be significant. Using the game to 
investigate a co-operation strategy may provide information on its use 
as a social policy. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma game was used to test the possible 
strategies. A number of factors were discovered to be essential to the 
effective use of the game as a model for behaviour. When predicting 
the likely gain or loss at each move, each player had to take into 
account the move of the other player, in addition to the past history of 
moves (Axelrod, p. 30). Because of the requirement for cumulative 
information, tests were carried out by means of computer tournaments. 
Participants were invited to submit strategies; the submissions were 
tested and analysed by computer in order to determine which strategy 
was the most effective in initiating and maintaining a scheme for co-
operative behaviour. 
Axelrod describes the first test as follows: 
It was structured as a round robin, meaning that each entry was paired with each 
other entry. As announced in the rules of the tournament, each entry was also 
paired with its own twin and with RANDOM, a program that randomly cooperates 
and defects with equal probability. Each game consisted of exactly two hundred 
moves (Axelrod, p. 30). 
In each move, co-operate or defect were the only possible moves, yet 
because the score depended on an interrelationship between moves, 
final scores were the results of a complex process. Amongst the tactics 
examined, the simplest proved to be the best (Axelrod, p. 31 ). 
Designated Tit for Tat, it began with co-operation, and from then on 
responded in kind to its opponent. This meant that if the other player 
defected, Tit for Tat also defected; if the opponent co-operated, Tit for 
Tat did also. Other entries which also scored high were ones with 
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similar rules to those of Tit for Tat. Those which scored the worst were 
entries which chose to defect without receiving prior provocation. The 
problem with these types of moves is that once a defection has been 
made, co-operation is difficult to re-establish: 
A major lesson of this tournament is the importance of minimizing echo effects in 
an environment of mutual power. When a single defection can set off a long 
string of recriminations and counterrecriminations, both sides suffer (Axelrod, p. 
38). 
If one responds to the defection, then one may be contributing to an 
ongoing chain of defections. On the other hand, should one continue to 
co-operate, one may be encouraging one's opponent to take further 
advantage. One can clearly see an analogy with life. If my neighbour 
ignores my requests to quiet her dog which barks most of the night, I 
may choose to play my radio at full volume while she is taking an 
afternoon sleep. After that, she is unlikely to develop much sympathy 
towards my request. 
The second round of the Prisoner's Dilemma game drew a large 
variety of game-strategies. Amongst the considerable number of 
complex options available, it was again the very simple Tit for Tat which 
won (Axelrod, p. 42). Some interesting patterns were beginning to 
emerge. If a strategy was slow to respond to a defection from an 
opponent, it was likely that the defections would continue (Axelrod, p. 
44). Being too relaxed or lenient was not conducive to a strong, 
productive result. As the participants in the second round of the game 
were aware of the results produced by the first round, their entries were 
considerably influenced by them (Axelrod, p. 47). Any such cumulative 
influence could be considered as an evolving pattern of behaviour 
(Axelrod, p. 49). Further extrapolation of results suggest that Tit for Tat 
is most rewarding when paired with itself, especially when compared to 
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playing against a persistently defecting opponent. Axelrod's study 
sought to build on his basic findings, suggesting some interesting 
implications for human conduct. 
By playing successive rounds of Prisoner's Dilemma, 
consideration of human behaviour from an evolutionary perspective 
was possible (Axelrod, p. 49). A number of factors were found to be 
relevant to the establishment of a co-operative strategy (Axelrod, p. 
171 ). These factors included such things as changing social 
environment and the outcome of simulation of many generations. The 
repeated playing of the game revealed how the various strategies either 
died out or became established. Analysis was particularly oriented to 
examination of the 'dilemma of co-operation' (Axelrod, p. 173). One's 
own potential for gain was always risked by co-operating, but rewards 
for both players were more secure in the long run once the opponent 
co-operated also. But to establish the practice of co-operation in society 
requires more than one willing individual. If one is operating in a 
hypothetical all-defecting environment, the effect of a single co-
operating individual is nil for as long a co-operation remains 
unreciprocated (Axelrod, p. 175). However, with sufficient numbers of 
people the story is different: 
cooperation can emerge from small clusters of discriminating individuals as long 
as these individuals have even a small proportion of their interactions with each 
other. So there must be some clustering of individuals who use strategies with 
two properties: the strategies will be the first to co-operate, and they will 
discriminate between those who respond to the cooperation and those who do 
not (Axelrod, p. 175). 
An essential component to establishment then, is that understanding is 
reached amongst a group of individuals on how they will respond to 
each other under given circumstances. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
35 
The viability and maintenance of successful strategies are also 
questions which can be addressed by the consideration of successive 
generations through game-play (Axelrod, p. 49). A resistant strategy 
requires the capability to survive amongst all possible opposition. 
Progressive elimination of unstable strategies reduced the field of 
contenders until, once again, Tit for Tat won (Axelrod, p. 53). Its 
endurance remained unrivalled: 
Tit for Tat never lost its first-place standing in a simulation of future generations of 
the tournament . Added to its victory in the first round of the tournament, and its 
fairly good performance in the laboratory experiments with human subjects, Tit 
for Tat is clearly a very successful strategy (Axelrod, p. 53). 
Pertinent to success is the relation between a given strategy and the 
conditions under which it prevails. The opponents of Tit for Tat soon 
realise that the only way they can make gains is to work with, rather than 
against it, in other words, to co-operate. Further analysis of results 
showed that to resist invasion by other strategies, it is necessary to 
respond to a defection immediately (Axelrod, p. 62); if this does not 
occur, a pattern of defection by the other player could be established; 
also, co-operation can be maintained when the relationship between 
players is expected to continue, in other words, if the future is sufficiently 
relevant. The final analysis of these experiments can be summed up as 
follows: the establishment of co-operation in a society depends on the 
presence of groups rather than single individuals; Tit for Tat is the most 
viable long-term strategy; swift, rather than delayed retaliation to 
defection is vital, and finally, players are influenced to co-operate by 
their awareness that the nature of future conditions will be an inevitable 
consequence of present decisions. A hypothetical example of 
reciprocal co-operation is given in Dawkins' study of 'selfish' genes. 
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3. A Hypothetical Case 
Dawkins drew attention to the fact that in nature a certain amount 
of behaviour is co-operative rather than competitive. The degree to 
which co-operation occurs in the apparently ruthless realm of nature is 
surprising. Dawkins specifically notes the grooming between members 
of some species, both birds and animals. The suggestion is that birds 
who require to preen themselves to remove damaging ticks would be 
unable to reach their own heads. Thus, they could groom each other on 
the top of the head, reciprocating the act as and when required. As this 
would not necessarily be immediately, some sort of memory would be 
required by the birds in order to identify to which of their fellows they 
owed favours. Dawkins quotes previous studies which indicate that 
reciprocal behaviour does in fact promote memory development in 
nature (Dawkins. p.183-184). He then hypothesises the likely outcome 
should some birds not be prepared to pay back the benefits received. 
Those refusing to acknowledge grooming are 'cheats', while those who 
initiate grooming, but whose actions are unreciprocated, are 'suckers.' 
If the majority of birds are 'suckers', the chance of each being groomed 
by one of their fellows is high. Were cheats to mount an invasion 
however, suckers would be outdone by their opponents' survival 
techniques. Under these circumstances, should the damage caused by 
ticks be fatal, the population of suckers would diminish until extinction 
occurred, but subsequently, having no-one to groom them, cheats 
would then suffer the same fate. 
Dawkins then postulates the existence of 'grudgers' (Dawkins, 
p.185). These are birds which groom their fellows, neighbours and 
strangers alike. They differ from suckers insofar that they have a 
definite expectation of reciprocation. They make a point of 
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remembering those to whom they have shown favour. However, if the 
grooming task is not returned when required, the grudger remembers 
the cheat, and subsequently withholds his service. A small population 
of grudgers amongst a large population of cheats will make little 
headway, but if there are sufficient numbers to form a relevant sub-
group, numbers could gradually increase until the orientation of the 
whole group is changed: 
When this critical proportion is reached they will start to average a higher pay-off 
than cheats, and the cheats will be driven at an accelerating rate towards 
extinction (Dawkins, p. 185). 
Computer-simulation proved to Dawkins that his thesis was correct. 
Where sufficient grudgers operated in a mixed society of grudgers, 
cheats, and suckers, grudger would prove to be the most viable. The 
interesting fact relating to the predicted fate of a largely cheating 
population is that although their favourable ratio ensures their outliving 
any opponents, their insular behaviour seals their own fate of eventual 
extinction (Dawkins, p. 186). Dawkins concludes this part of his study 
with an account of the amazing conduct of certain species of fish 
(Dawkins, p. 187). Large fish resist the opportunity to eat smaller prey 
because of the advantageous symbiotic relationship. 
The parallel between Dawkins' findings and those of Axelrod is 
striking. In both cases, groups rather than individuals are necessary to 
establishing co-operation in a society. Both support the viability of 
reciprocal altruism, beneficial behaviour enacted by one towards 
another, returned immediately in Axelrod's model, later in that of 
Dawkins. In terms of human behaviour, this could be understood as 
caring or helping actions performed by persons or groups towards 
others, who would remember both the actions and the performers. At 
some time, either sooner or later, when help was needed by the first 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
38 
persons or groups, those whom they have helped would return the 
favour. Plausible examples on an individual, group, and even global 
level are not difficult to imagine. One student may help another through 
a difficult time, to find later that her friend does the same for her. A 
resident, secure family may nominate and foster a family from a 
repressive, war-torn regime. Some years later, their own fortunes may 
change for the worst, but, remembering how they had been cared for, 
the now successful former migrants may financially help their former 
benefactors. Finally, a country ravaged by drought and famine may 
receive generous food supplies from their more fortunate neighbours, or 
even from the other side of the world. Climatic conditions could 
subsequently change, reversing the previous situation, and causing the 
prior generosity to be reciprocated. 
To summarise our progress thus far: Nietzsche's attack on pity, 
sympathy and altruism stems from his belief, firstly, that they may not be 
genuine, and secondly, that if they are, they hold life-diminishing 
potential; Rachels concludes that Psychological Egoism cannot 
explain all instances of apparent altruism, and that feeling good about 
helping confirms the genuine character of altruistic motivation; Dawkins 
highlights the place held by co-operation in nature, and also 
distinguishes genetically influenced action from self-conscious choice; 
Batson concludes that genuinely altruistic action can and does occur; 
examination of a particular case of such altruism throws Nietzsche's 
conclusion into doubt; Axelrod's studies lead to the belief that, given 
certain conditions, co-operation can be established and maintained in a 
previously non-co-operative society, and further, that it is, in fact, the 
most viable of the strategies considered; a re-examination of Dawkins 
shows that he concurs with Axelrod's conclusions. Before considering 
the relevance of these findings to Nietzsche, it would be appropriate to 
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examine the other side of the issue: Is there a negative aspect to 
altruism? 
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Objection? 
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Nietzsche's objection to altruistic practices and the sentiments 
that cause them has been outlined. As part of his morality, they have 
little place in a world that seeks to promote and enhance life to the full. 
The argument against altruism has been taken further by Ayn Rand. It is 
not possible to deal with all her objections here, but a selection will 
illustrate key aspects of her thinking. In her explication of Objectivist 
Ethics16, she refers to certain principles by which one should live: 
The standard of value of the Objectivist ethics - the standard by which one judges 
what is good or evil - is man's life, or: that which is required for man's survival qua 
man (Rand p. 23). 
Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man's life (Rand, p. 25). 
The basic social principle of Objectivist ethics is that just as life is an end in itself, 
so every living human being is an end in himself (Rand, p. 27). 
The Objectivist ethics proudly advocates and upholds rational selfishness - which 
means: the values required for human survival (Rand, p. 31 ). 
In her elaboration of these principles she emphasises the importance of 
one's own happiness, claiming that it is part of the same issue as one's 
survival (Rand, p. 29). Contrasted with this are actions oriented towards 
another person's survival. She considers actions on one's own behalf 
and those on behalf of others as mutually contradictory: 
Altruism declares that an action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any 
action taken for one's own benefit is evil. Thus the beneficiary of an action is the 
only criterion of moral value - and so long as that beneficiary is anybody other 
than oneself, anything goes .... Observe what this beneficiary-criterion of morality 
does to a man's life. The first thing he learns is that morality is his enemy: he has 
16Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: The New American Library, 1961). 
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nothing to gain from it, he can only lose; self-inflicted loss, self-inflicted pain and 
the gray, debilitating pall of an incomprehensible duty is all that he can expect 
(Rand, p. viii). 
Her explication of selfishness is less severe, 
the exact meaning and dictionary definition of the word "selfishness" is: 
concern with one's interests (Rand, p. vii). 
Altruistic actions, actions performed for the benefit of others then, are 
contradictory to one's own interests, in other words, a sacrifice. Such a 
concept is also evil: 
It is not necessary, in this context, to analyze the almost countless evils entailed 
be the precept of self-sacrifice .... A sacrifice, it is necessary to remember, means 
the surrender of a higher value in favor of a lower value or of nonvalue ... or if one 
gives up a lesser value in order to obtain a greater one - this is not a sacrifice, but 
a gain (Rand, p. 40). 
For Rand then, altruistic actions and their attendant sentiments impede 
the actions necessary to preserve one's own life, and consequent 
happiness. To employ one's self in the service of others is to prostitute 
one's own best interests to those of someone else. To do so is both 
irrational and immoral. 
Consideration of Rand's objections raises several issues relating 
to the theoretical and practical implications of an other-regarding 
morality as compared to a self-regarding morality. Two of these issues 
will be examined; the first relates to her definitions of terms and the 
second to her stated consequences of altruistic actions. Three of 
Rand's definitions will be queried, altruism, selfishness, and sacrifice. 
She takes altruism to mean that action undertaken on behalf of 
others is good, whilst that taken for oneself is evil. Standard definitions 
of altruism are readily available: 
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-unselfish concern for the welfare of others: opposed to egoism 17 
-Regard for others as a principle of action; opp. to egoism or selfishness {The 
Shorter Oxford, p. 54). 
-unselfish concern for the welfare of others 18 
-unselfish interest in the welfare of others 19 
These definitions have in common an acknowledgment of attention 
given by individuals to other persons. Two out of the four definitions 
refer to the presence of opposition between altruism and egoism. 
However, I am unable to locate any evidence for the contention that 
altruism implies 'that any action taken for the benefit of others is good, 
and any action taken for one's own benefit is evil' Rand implies that 
there necessarily exists a correlation between helping others and 
depriving oneself. Results of the investigation so far indicate that this is 
not always the case. 
Rand claims the dictionary definition of selfishness to be 
'concern with one's own interests' . My research came up with the 
following: 
-caring only or chiefly for the self; regarding one's own interest solely or chiefly; 
proceeding from love of self; influenced in actions solely by a view to private 
advantage (Websters, p. 1646). 
17webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Supervisor J.L. McKechnie (Cleveland: 
The World Publishing Company, 1955) p. 53. 
18 Collins Australian Pocket Dictionary of the English Language, ed. W.A.Krebs 
(Sydney: Collins, 1981) p. 23. 
19The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ed. F.C. Mish (Springfield, Massachusestts: 
Merriam-Webster Inc, 1989) p. 39. 
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-Devoted to or concerned with one's own advantage or welfare to the exclusion 
of regard for others (Oxford, p.1934). 
-too much concerned with one's own welfare or interests (Collins, p. 767). 
-taking care of one's own comfort, pleasure, or interest excessively or without 
regard for others (Merriam-Webster p. 657). 
Again, common threads can be found among the slightly varied 
definitions, namely those of referring to the excessive degree of self-
interest. Two of the four definitions mention that self-concern is at the 
expense of other-concern, and a third speaks of its restricted nature. 
Selfishness is usually understood as going beyond the range of the 
mere self-regard implied by Rand's definition. To infer that selfishness 
is simply concern for one's own welfare is to disregard an essential 
element in its meaning. By doing this, Rand's argument in favour of 
selfishness omits one of its important consequences. 
Rand has interpreted sacrifice as the subordination of higher 
value to lower value. Several dictionaries reveal the following: 
-a giving up, destroying, permitting injury to, or foregoing of some valued thing 
for the sake of something of greater value or of having a more pressing claim 
-a selling or giving up of something at less than its supposed value (Websters, 
p. 1593). 
-The destruction or surrender of something valued or desired for the sake of 
something having a higher or more pressing claim; the loss entailed by devotion 
to some other interest; also the thing so devoted or surrendered 
-A loss incurred in selling something below its value for the sake of getting rid of 
it (Oxford, p. 1871). 
-a giving up, destroying, etc. of one thing for the sake of another 
a selling of a thing at Jess than its value (Collins, p. 744). 
-Loss, Deprivation to accept the loss or destruction of for an end, cause, or ideal 
(Merriam p. 642). 
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Common to these definitions is the notion of rejecting one thing to 
obtain another. But what is salient in this instance is that the 
relationship between that rejected and that gained is not fixed. Three 
definitions refer to a commodity of lower value being surrendered for 
that of a higher; three refer to the reverse situation, that is, giving up 
something of a higher value for something of a lower, and finally, one 
definition does not refer to relative values at all. But Rand's definition 
infers that one always gives up a higher value for something lower, thus 
implying that one always loses out. 
A number of principles are claimed for objectivist ethics, for 
example that the standard of judgement for good or evil is human life, 
the central purpose of which is productive work, and that survival 
depends on 'rational selfishness'. If what counts as good and what 
counts as evil relates to its ability to sustain human life, one needs to 
assess Rand's judgments in light of that understanding. Can we be 
certain that 'rational selfishness' is necessarily the best method to 
ensure human survival? It is apparent from Rand's understanding that 
she regards the activity of caring for the self as standing in opposition to 
that of caring for others, which is evil. None of the experiments or 
investigations so far discussed support the idea that selfless actions 
necessarily oppose self-regarding actions, or that selfish actions are the 
most life-sustaining strategy amongst the available options. Dawkins' 
symbiosis and 'grudger' strategy, Batson's empathy-altruism 
hypothesis, and Axelrod's reciprocal altruism all strongly imply the 
precise opposite, namely, that many altruistic actions are of mutual 
benefit to both giver and receiver, and that they are conducive to long-
term survival. In view of these findings, Rand's objections to the 
practice of altruism cannot be regarded as conclusive. 
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Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion 
The task remains to measure the findings of this study against 
Nietzsche's arguments. His objections centred on the belief that 
selfless feelings and selfless actions are seriously detrimental to the 
human condition. Nietzsche also believed that many cases of apparent 
altruism were not genuine. A central aim of this essay is to test his 
theories against empirical evidence to discover the correctness of his 
views, and whether a re-appraisal of pity, sympathy and altruism is 
required. Evidence indicates that at least two kinds of altruistic 
behaviour do occur, genuine altruism, and reciprocal altruism, also 
referred to as co-operative behaviour. 
Research by Dawkins into genes reveals that while the genetic 
impulse is fundamentally 'selfish', learned human behaviour can 
predominate when desired. In other words, genes do not always 
prevent us from acting as we choose, altruistically or otherwise. 
Rachels concluded that certain features of apparently altruistic actions 
confirm the authenticity of such motivations. In Batson's investigations, 
true altruistic actions were found to have occurred in experiments where 
empathy had been established between participants. Study of a 
hypothetical example tested Nietzsche's thesis regarding possible 
damaging outcomes of altruism. 
Experiments also revealed that a considerable amount of 
reciprocal altruism is practiced. The seemingly unrelenting world of 
nature abounds in co-operative behaviour, within and between species. 
In his analysis of game-play theory, Axelrod found that co-operation was 
the best option. The implication is that co-operative behaviour holds a 
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real and significant place in the natural world, especially in the human 
domain. 
These findings reveal a number of points relevant to Nietzsche's 
thesis on the status of pity, sympathy and altruism. His claim that most 
cases are either deceptive or predominantly egoistic was not supported 
by any of the theorists considered. Experiments where pity motivated 
empathy and helping actions did not suggest any weakening or adverse 
consequences. Consideration of altruistic actions which might be 
performed on behalf of the sick, wretched or poor show that they might 
not necessarily undermine life in the way feared by Nietzsche. 
Studies of reciprocal altruism bring to light its potential as a 
strategy for co-operative behaviour. Nietzsche is correct in his 
assumptions that thoughts of the others are often allied with thoughts of 
self, but not that the best outcome necessarily lies in promoting the self 
over others. A brief assessment follows of both the long-term 
implications and the possible wider consequences, firstly of genuine 
altruism, and secondly, of reciprocal altruism. 
No evidence has been brought to light in any of the studies, 
which suggests that detrimental effects might ensue in the long-term, of 
either selfless feelings or selfless actions. The study of genuine altruism 
showed it to have provided relief in simulated crisis situations. Cases of 
the poor and sick like those helped by the volunteers in India will not be 
eradicated overnight. The accounts of help given by the workers 
suggest they experienced considerable benefit from their work. 
Consideration of the issues involved suggests that human life as a 
whole could be threatened if we take for granted that some forms of life 
are expendable. 
Examination of reciprocal altruism has shown its potential 
benefits in society. It appears to be an intrinsic part of nature, and to be 
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an effective component in human interaction. As part of the genetic 
framework it is strategically aimed towards long-term survival. 
Computer studies of both Dawkins' grudger strategy and Axelrod's 
game-play show it to be the best survival strategy. Extrapolating to the 
world of human activity suggests that co-operative behaviour holds an 
essential place among individuals and groups. It holds advantages 
which cannot be attributed to other strategies, such as those of 'sucker' 
and 'cheat.' What this means in practical terms is that persons who 
consistently subordinate their needs and concerns to those of others will 
eventually become deficient in themselves. Alternatively, those who 
exercise excessive power and domination, constantly taking from 
others, may appear to 'win' in the short term, but will eventually run out 
of resources. Long-term survival requires the balanced approach of co-
operation. 
Increased co-operation throughout society provides a framework 
for problem-solving and negotiations on many fronts, such as 
educational, economic and political. Mutual consideration yields a 
more satisfactory outcome than arrangements which take into account 
the needs of only one side. An excessively power-dominated structure 
will deplete its own potential by over-indulgence, thereby becoming 
unviable. On the other hand, the spread of co-operative approaches to 
negotiations and problem-solving will have a more stabilising and 
productive effect. Co-operation in policy-making provides for mutual 
input, thus ensuring more mutually satisfactory outcomes. 
Relating these findings to Nietzsche's philosophy will be assisted 
by recapitulating key aspects of his thought. With the conviction that 
values and certainties were missing, that attitudes towards life were 
deficient, and that a new approach was required, Nietzsche undertook 
to change attitudes which he found detrimental to life. His commitment 
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to the curbing of pity, sympathy and altruism was based on his 
estimation of them as in general weakening and life-depleting. 
However, the evidence indicates that the presence of selfless feelings 
and selfless actions do not necessarily operate in the way suggested by 
Nietzsche. It appears that they can form a positive component in human 
affairs. Concern for others, whether one-sided, generated by feelings of 
pity, or whether calculated, generated by mutual concerns, is capable of 
being a significant asset to life in a number of ways. While there cannot, 
of course, be a single conclusive answer to this issue, a society based 
on a secular social order may not be as damaged by an increase in pity, 
sympathy or altruism as was feared by Nietzsche. There is strong case 
that many of the forms which he feared do bring positive consequences, 
and may, in fact, be part of the natural foundation for positive human life 
which he so earnestly sought. 
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